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Introduction 
The accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain, like any enlargement of the Com-
munity, will obviously necessitate adjustments and transitional arrangements. But
these familiar concepts gain a new dimension when applied to a Community
which will have lost much of its homogeneity by a two-phase doubling of its
membership. If the Community. is to be preserved and developed so that it can
integrate the new Member States and live up to their expectations, there can be
no thought, in the period leading up to enlargement, of any relaxation of efforts
to complete the common market, to move towards economic and monetary
union and to formulate common policies on energy, regional development and
tax harmonization.
This is why this paper is not content to outline a simple transitional formula
based on that worked out for the 1973 enlargement and list the unavoidable,
more or less numerical adjustments, Far more attention has had to be paid to
the need first to devise a genuine transitional strategy to facilitate full integration
of the new members and second to plan adjustments which would help to keep
the Community running smoothly.
1 This Commission Communication is the second part of the general considerations on the problems
of enlargement (Supplement 1/1978). Supplement 3/1978 analyses the economic and sectoral aspects
of enlargement.Part One
Transitional period
Basic approach
1. At the time of the first enlargement it
was decided that the acceding countries
would be allowed a transitional period in
which to adjust to existing Community legis-
lation  (acquis communautaire).  This was .es-
sentially the same for all sectors and featured
fixed, relatively short timetables. In addition,
the three countries were involved in the
Community decision-making procedures
and in political cooperation activities as soon
as the Accession Treaty was signed and par-
ticipated fully in the work of all the institu-
tionsonce it entered into force, The choice
of transitional arrangements was in fact dic-
tated by the largely comparable situations of
the ' Six' and the ' Three
2. The accession of Greece, Portugal and
Spain presents rather different transitional
problems. The solutions to be devised must
promote the integration of countries with a
level of development well below the Com-
munity average; they must allow for an ad-
ditional effort to reorganize structures within
the existing Community; and they must be
conceived in such a way that the enlarged
Community can be consolidated without im-
peding progress.
3. This being so, the end result of any at-
tempt to plan and regulate the transition
along the strict lines of the first Accession
Treaty might be the opposite of that in-
tended: instead of guaranteeing orderly inte-
gration of the acceding countries into the
Community system, the enlarged Communi-
ty might seize up or the new members, and
perhaps certain existing members, might find
it impossible to honour their obligations. It
would be preferable therefore to find a sim-
ple formula that would allow a measure of
flexibility in the management of the tran-
sitional period. The considerations which fol-
low are based on this pragmatic approach,
They set out to establish a general frame-
work for reflection without prejudice to any
special arrangements which may be found
necessary during the negotiations to deal
with the special situation of one or other 
the applicants,
Negotiating period
4. Given the extent of the adjustment prob..
lems, it would seem advisable to tackle them
during the negotiating period, without, how-
ever, delaying accession. The Community
could go beyond mere encouragement of
unilateral initiatives designed to facilitate in-
tegration of the applicant .countries. The
structural redevelopment policies applied by
the Community and the applicant countries
should be coordinated, if not actually har-
monized, in preparation for enlargement. The
two sides should also endeavour to make
their economies as complementary as possi-
ble. Enlargement must not be allowed to ag-
gravate the sectoral or regional problems al-
ready facing the Community, many of them
shared by the applicant countries (for exam-
ple, problems in Mediterranean agriculture
and in the steel, textile, footwear and ship-
building industries), With this in mind the
Commission could liaise with the applicant
countries and organize consultations on any
important measures either side might 
planning to introduce.
Interim period between signature
and entry into force of the act
of accession
5. Once the act of accession was signed the
acceding States would be progressive:y in-
volved in Community procedures and politi-
cal cooperation, although they would have
no formal rights in the matter. In particular
they would have to be associated in some
way or other with the formulation of new
policies and the revision of existing ones.
This brings to mind the favourableexperi-
ence acquired at the time of the first enlarge-
S. 2/78ment, when all important Community deci-
sions liable to affect the acceding countries
were discussed in detail by the two sides.
These preliminary contacts and consultations
were taken care of by the Commission itself
as far as Commission proposals and decisions
were concerned. On the Council side con-
tacts were organized within an interim com-
mittee consisting of representatives of the
Community and the acceding States on the
basis of common guidelines agreed by the
Six. Furthermore, during the months imme-
diately preceding entry, the acceding Stat~s
actually played quite a large part in Council
deliberations.
Following this precedent the countries
now applying for membership would have to
undertake to consult the Commission in ad-
vance on any national measure, legislative or
otherwise, which might affect the function-
ing of the Community after enlargement.
The transitional period proper
6. Accession of the new Member States
would involve their immediate and full par-
ticipation in all Community institutions and
bodies and in the decision-making process.
This equality of rights would have to be
matched by an equality of obligations, with
the sole exception of obligations~limited in
extent and in time-peculiar to the tran-
sitional period.
7. Given the larger scale of the adaptation
exercise, it is obvious that the transitional
period (the content of which would have to
be determined in the act of accession) cannot
be any shorter than that adopted for the first
enlargement (five years). It would have to
end on a fixed date and could not be too
long lest the incentive to reform be lost and
Community cohesion compromised. Further-
more, the transitional period actually neces-
sary will depend in each case not only on the
initial situation of the new member but also
on the development of the economic situa-
tion in Europe and the world during the pe-
riod of integration. Depending on the situa-
tion, ten years might be regarded as the
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maximum and five years as the minimum
necessary to complete the transition.
8. The scale and complexity of the integra-
tion problems to be resolved call for a greater
degree of flexibility in the transitional proce-
dures than at the time of the first enlarge-
ment. A possible basis here would be some
of the rules established for the progressive
establishment of the common market (Arti-
cle 8 of the EEC Treaty). It would also seem
appropriate to divide the transitional period
(if it were longer than five years) into two
stages, each with a clearly defined pro-
gramme.
9. This general arrangement should have
sufficient built-in flexibility to allow for the
differences between the adaptation difficul-
ties peculiar to each sector-which rules out
a uniform conception of the transitionalpe-
riod. The progress to be made during each of
the stages would be set out in specific pro~
grammes for individual sectors or groups of
sectors, account being taken of the clear in-
terdependence of the formulas to be adopted.
In each case it would be necessary to deter-
mine the correct blend of automatic and flex-
ible elements in the integration process. The
solutions chosen should not only promote
rapid, effective integration of the new Mem-
ber States, they should also cater for existing
needs in the Community of Nine and guar-
antee the subsequent development of the
Community of Twelve.
10. The first stage should see the attain-
ment of precise objectives in each sector in
line with a timetable designed to ensure that
by the end of that stage, the new Member
States are as fully integrated as possible. In
view of the adaptation effort that would be
required, it seems logical that the Communi-
ty should use the financial instruments at its
It is true that the Treaty of Rome (Article 8 of the
EEC Treaty) provided for a twelve-year transitional pe-
riod. But the comparison is not a valid one. The provi-
sions in question were experimental. In practice it
proved possible to shorten the period and many of the
clauses dictated by caution during negotiation of the
Rome Treaties proved unnecessary in the end. Indeed
some were never used.disposal to channel maximum special assist-
ance to the new Member States during this
period, and also set aside sufficient funds to
assist the Nine in making any adjustments
that might be necessary on their side.
11. Should it become factually apparent
that the key objectives set could not be at-
tained in time, a decision might be taken by
the Council, on a proposal from the Com-
mission, to extend the first stage. The deci-
sion would be taken by a qualified majority
in the case of an initial extension (length to
be determined). If a second extension proved
necessary, unanimity would be required. The
decision would be taken well before the end
of the first stage and would mean an auto-
matic reduction in the length of the second
stage.
12. Over and above the measure of flexi-
bility thus added to the transitional period
the second stage would serve to complete in-
tegration in sectors where the adjustments
were so complicated or so extensive as to
need the full transitional period.
13. In addition to the provisions peculiar to
each stage, a number of clauses would be
valid for the entire transitional period. For
example the requirement to adopt the  acquis
communautaire  should be qualified in certain
cases by special safeguard clauses to cope
with unforeseeable difficulties. The same
would apply to the Nine, in view of the
dangers enlargement could present for some
sensitive sectors. A general safeguard clause
of the type provided for in Article 135 of the
first Act of Accession could be invoked
throughout the transitional period.
14. The new accession treaty should not be
content to regulate, with the necessary pre-
cautions and flexibility, arrangements for the
adoption of the  acquis communautaire. 
should also provide for the development of
the Community during the transitional peri-
od. It could happen that one or other of the
new Member States might not be able, for
serious reasons, to participate from the outset
in the implementation of a new policy. A
standstill in Community activity must be
avoided at all costs. A possible response to
these problems would be derogation or safe-
guard clauses for a limited period. Provisions
of this kind would not be a new departure
for the Community: the protocols to the
EEC Treaty afford numerous examples. In
framing a new policy and exceptions of this
kind, the Community should approve special
measures which would allow the Member
State in question to catch up. The same con-
sideration would apply in the event of far-
reaching changes to existing policies if the
policy in question had still to be applied by
the new Member State.
15. Provision should therefore be made in
the accession treaty for the possibility of re-
course to such formulas (derogation and
catching-up) to deal with developments aris-
ing during the transitional period. The deci-
sion to invoke a clause of this kind should
be taken within the Community institutions
in accordance with normal procedures. If ex-
ceptions to the fundamental principle of full
participation by all Member States in the de-
cision-making process were contemplated
exceptions should be strictly limited to acts
of short duration, confined to the transitional
period (compare non-participation in the ma-
chinery of the European Development Fund
after the first enlargement), or to simple ad-
ministrative measures of no interest to the
acceding State or States. However, if it were
necessary to provide for  ad hoc  decision-
making procedures, the weighting applicable
to qualified majority voting would have to be
adjusted. Furthermore allowance would
have to be made for the fact that there will
doubtless be three different transitional peri-
ods. These complications militate in favour
of an alternative approach-namely, absten-
tion.
16. Subject to any strictly limited excep-
tions or derogations specified in the accession
treaty, the end of the transitional period
would represent the ultimate deadline for en-
try into force of all Community rules and ap-
plication of all measures associated with en-
largement.
S. 2/78Part Two
Adjustments to the Treaties
necessitated by enlargement
17. For political reasons the only adjust-
ments made to provisions of the Treaties by
the first Accession Treaty in 1972 were those
directly reflecting the increase in the number
of Member States. With the new accessions
there will be twice as many Member States
as in the Community as originally constitut-
ed. The Community will find itself less ho-
mogeneous as a result of the different poli-
tical, economic and social structures of the
new members, and this will make it more
difficult to reach joint decisions and apply
them properly.
18. The Community institutions were de-
signed with six countries in view. Experience
in the changeover from six to nine members
has already revealed that it is difficult or
even impossible to act and react in concert.
When there are twelve members the institu-
tions and decision-making procedures will be
under considerable strain; holdups and sec-
ond-best compromises are inevitable if the
Community modus operandi  is not im-
proved. Various practical administrative col!-
siderations, such as the use of languages, will
have to be borne in mind too. The questions
arising in this connection require further stu-
dy; it would be premature to suggest answers
at this stage.
More far-reaching changes will therefore be
necessary this time if the enlarged Commu-
nity is to work properly. From the legal angle
there is no reason why the concept of adjust-
ment of the Treaties of Rome (Article 237 of
the EEC Treaty and 205 of the Euratom
Treaty) should not be interpreted more
broadly than in the past, as long as there is
definite causal link betw~en the adjust-
ments to the Treaties and the enlargement of
the Community and as long as it is borne in
mind that any change in the fundamental
principles of the Treaties can be made only
by the special procedure laid down for that
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purpose. The position as regards adjustments
to the ECSC Treaty is rather different and
will be considered separately. 1
, Numerical' changes
19. When considering what ' numerical'
changes in the composition and operation. of
the institutions will be entailed by the in-
crease in the number of Member States we
can only refer to the rule, defined when the
institutions merged in 1967 and confirmed at
the time of the 1973 enlargement, that all
the Member States must be represented in
every Community institution and body. The
Community must also remain consistent and
avoid any appreciable shift in the existing
balance. of power between Member States. Si-
milar decisions taken in the past, when the
Community was established and later when
it was enlarged for the first time, were based
on a combination of factors: the Member
States were ranked in order of size measured
by population, but political considerations also
entered into the calculation (see Table 1 , p. 11)
gives certain basic statistics for all Member
States and the States that have applied for
membership. There can be no golden rule
but the table suggests that Greece and Por-
tugal should occupy much the same position
as Belgium and the Netherlands, whereas
Spain lies between this group and the . big
countries (Germany, Italy, the United KIng~
dom and France).
20. For the distribution of seats in the di-
rectly elected European Parliament, it would
follow from the calculation method adopted
by Parliament itself2 that Spain would have
50 seats while Greece and Portugal would
elect 23 members each. But, as the Nine de-
parted from Parliament proposal when
Points 23 and 47.
Parliament's method of calculation gave a variable
number of seats for each population bracket to offset the
excessive power that would havy been held by the larger
countries on a strict population
' y
~rdstick (draft conven-
tion adopted by Parliament on 14. 1.1975; Bull. EC 1-
1975, point 2501).adopting the definitive distribution, these fig-
ures will have to be adjusted slightly.
Greece and Portugal should have the same
number of members as Belgium (24), which
was given one more member than it would
have had under Parliament's method. Spain
might be given something like 58 seats since,
among the Nine, the four large countries
were given 81 each (instead of 65, 66, 67 and
71 under Parliament's method); this figure
reflecting population levels, would put Spain
roughly half way between the large and the
medium-sized countries (in proportions of
5: 8 : 10). While the total number of Members
of the European Parliament (516) might seem
rather large, it would not be a good idea to
try and reduce the figure by altering the dis-
tribution of seats among the Nine.
21. Where the Council is required to act by
qualified majority, the weighting of the
votes of the new Members will have to be
established. Using the same basis as in the
Community of Nine (Article 148(2) of the
EEC Treaty and Article 118(2) of the Eur-
atom Treaty), Greece and Portugal would
have five votes each, the same as Belgium
and the Netherlands. As the four large Com-
munity countries have ten votes each, the
figure for Spain might be eight. This would
give a total voting strength of 76. The num-
ber of votes required for a qualified majority
could be set at 51. Council decisions not tak-
en on a Commission proposal should require
the votes of at least eight countries, corre-
sponding to the two-thirds proportion re-
quired in the Community as at present con-
stituted (6 out of 9) and as originally consti-
tuted (4 out of 6).
22. The existing balance of power between
the Member States would thus be broadly
preserved. In the Community of Nine, the
four large countries together cannot consti-
tute a qualified majority (41 votes) without
the support of at least one of the smaller
countries; a comparable situation would ob~
tain in the Community of Twelve, since
those four countries plus Spain would still
not be strong enough. Two large countries
acting together would still not be able to
raise between them the 25 votes required to
block a measur~r (in the budgetary con-
text) to pass it: they would still require the
votes at least of one or more of the smaller
countries.
23. The special rules in the ECSC Treaty
(second and fourth paragraphs of Article 28)
which refer to shares in aggregate coal and
steel output in the Community would not
appear to be affected by enlargement, as
none of the applicant countries accounts for
one eighth of output (Spain currently ac-
counts for between 10 and 11 %). The eight-
ninths majority required for certain amend-
ments to the Treaty by the second and third
paragraphs of Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty
should be changed to five-sixths (ten-
twelfths) in a Community of Twelve; this
would bring back the quorum that applied in
the Community of Six but was subsequently
abandoned for arithmetical reasons in the
Community of Nine.
24. As for the future composition of the
Commission the guiding principle, as for the
other institutions of the Community, should
be to assure its efficient functioning. Various
formulas would be possible: one possibility,
already suggested by the Commission and
favourably considered by the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs (informal meeting at Leeds
Castle) is that the College would be com-
posed of one national of each Member State.
However, it would result in a marginal re-
duction of the number of Members of the
Commission from the existing level of thir-
teen, which would pose certain practical
problems in view of the increased burden of
work in a wider Community, particularly
during the transitional period.
25. The changes in the composition and
operation of the Court of Justice required by
enlargement will be considered in an opinion
which the Commission has already asked the
Court itself to give. Even before that opinion
has been given, it may be stated that appli-
cation of the existing criteria (Articles 165 of
I Total number of votes for all the Member States (76)
less the minimum required for a qualified majority (51).
S. 2/78Table 1  Numerical participation in the Community institutions
Indicators of size of country Participation in institutions
GNP European Parliament
Surface Population 1976 Council Court of
area 1976 (USD Directly weight- Commission Justice Economic
(1000 km (millions)3 thousand Now ing (Judges)8 and Social
million)4 elected Committee
Germany 248. 61.5 445.30
United Kingdom 244. 56. 218.
Italy 301.3 56. 170.
France 547. 52. 346. I 7
Spain I 504. 36. 104. 58 6 18 9
Netherlands 41.2 13. 89.30
Belgium 30.5 66.35
Greece I 132 22. 14 5
Portugal I  91.6 14.
Denmark 43.1 38.
Norway 2 323. 31.30
Ireland 70.3
Luxembourg 0.4
Participation in the different institutions as suggested in the present report. Greece has proposed the same figures.
Participation levels in 1972 Act of Accession.
J Source: SOEC and Commission.
4 Source: Commission.
s Level proposed by Greece.
6 Based on proposed Council weighting for Spain of 8 votes i.e. between groups of medium-sized and large countries in ratio of 5:8:10. Calculated
figure = 58.2 with medium countries having 24 seats, 58.6 if assumed to have 25.
Possible level, instead of 2 each as at present.
8 Subject to view of Court of Justice.
Calculation on same basis as for elected parliament = 19.2 seats. Rounded down to 18 to allow for equal size of three interest groups.
10 It is unlikely that the coal and steel output of any of the applicant States will reach one eighth of the total value of output of the enlarged Community.
This aspect of Article 28 of the ECSC Treaty will therefore be unaffected by enlargement.
the EEC Treaty, 137 of the Eur.atom Treaty
and 32 of the ECSC Treaty) would mean
that the Court should consist of thirteen
judges (an odd number to avoid tied votes).
26. The Court of Auditors will have to
have one new member for each new Member
State.
27. In the Economic and Social Committee
there should be twelve seats each for Greece
and Portugal (as for Belgium and the Neth-
erlands) and eighteen for Spain to reflect the
relative sizes of the applicant.. countries.
28. The ECSC Consultative Committee
(Article 18 of the ECSC Treaty) and the Eur-
atom Scientific and Technical Committee
(Article 134(2) of the Euratom Treaty) will
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have to be expanded to make room for re-
presentatives from the new Member
States-the number of extra seats can be
settled later.
29. The European Investment Bank will
presumably give its opinion on the changes
that will have to be made to the EIB Proto-
col to the EEC Treaty, chiefly Articles 3, 4
11 and 12.
Adjustments required to enable the
enlarged Community to operate properly
30. Above and beyond these inevitable ad-
justments the Treaties will have to 
changed further if the functioning of the
Community institutions is to be improved tocombat the tendency for decision-making
procedures to become more cumbersome as a
larger number of States are involved. The
main changes would be to make greater use
of majority voting on matters which practical
experience has shown to be suitable for it, to
have the Commission, as a rule, exercise ad-
ministrative and executive functions and to
take greater care in deciding which of the le~
gal instruments provided for by the Treaties
is to be used in each case and how it is to
be implemented.
Use Ql the qualified mqjority
31. In a twelve-member Community the
Council's ability to reach decisions within ac-
ceptable periods of time is likely to be com~
promised. This ' mechanical' hitch could 
some extent be repaired by more frequent
use of majority voting, notably in cases
where experience in the Community of Nine
has shown that holdups are likely to occur.
Naturally the Commission has no intention
of reviving an old quarrel on a particularly
delicate point, on which the Member States
agreed to disagree when it last came to a
head. The idea now is not to go back on that
agreement' but  rather to take up the ap~
proach adopted by the Heads of State or
Government at their Paris Summit at the
end of 1974 and expressed in their commu-
nique: ' In order to improve the functioning
of the Council of the Community, they con-
sider that it is necessary to renounce the
practice which consists of making agreement
on all questions conditional on the unanim~
ous consent of the Member States, whatever
their respective positions may be regarding
the conclusions reached in Luxembourg on
28 January 1966'
32. The value of this approach has been
confirmed by a practice which has been
developing gradually since 1975. Majority
voting in the Council has been extenaed
pragmatically. Ever greater use is being made
of the procedure in all matters which raise
no important political questions such as
might give a Member State a valid reason for
demanding a unanimous decision despite the
legal possibility of a majority decision. A pol-
iticalcode of conduct has gradually emer-ged
and is now accepted by all the Member
States.
33. Considering this development and the
implications of enlargement, it may legiti~
mately be asked whether the Community
would not gain valuable room for manoeuvre
if the areas in which this code applies were
extended. A number of cases are currently
outside its purview since the very text of the
Treaty is against it, requiring a unanimous
decision although there are valid reasons for
preferring a more open-minded attitude. In
other words, the point is to consider in each
case whether the unanimity rule should be
maintained in all its rigour, even where ex-
perience suggests that there is no imperious
reason for doing SO.2 The working assump-
I Point 6 of the communique; Bull. EC 12-1974, point
1104.
2 The unanimity rule would therefore continue to
apply in all cases involving a decision to determine or
specify the scope of the Treaties:
second paragraph of Article 59 of the EEC Treaty
(extension of provisions relating to freedom to provide
services to nationals of non-member countries);
Article 223(2) of the EEC Treaty (list of war
materials);
Article 227 of theEEC Treaty (overseas departments);
Article 235 of the EEC Treaty and Article 203 of the
Euratom Treaty (cases where the Treaties do not
confer the necessary powers);
or where the Treaties are to be supplemented or
adjusted:
Article 138(3) of the EEC Treaty and Article 108(3) of
the Euratom Treaty (direct elections);
third paragraph of Article 201 of the EEC Treaty and
third paragraph of Article 173 of the Euratom Treaty
(replacement of financial contributions by own re-
sources or levies);
Article 76 of the Euratom Treaty (amendment of
provisions relating to supplies);
Article 85 of the Euratom Treaty (safeguards);
Article 90 of the Euratom Treaty (system of owner-
ship for fissile materials.
Nor is there to be any change in the unanimity rule for
provisions concerning enlargement:
first paragraph of Article 237 of the EEC Treaty and
first paragraph of Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty;
or those concerning the association of countries and
territories outside the Communities:
S. 2/78tion underlying the considerations below is
based on a conviction that a more flexible
approach would make it possible to eliminate
the sources of holdups arising exclusively
from actual Treaty provisions, without de-
priving the fundamental interests of the
Member States of the full protection given by
a political safety net whose  raison d' i?tre 
nowadays uncontested.
34. The approach that we have taken in
what follows involves excluding all cases that
might affect the principles and bases of th~
Community (these would in any event be
excluded under Article 237 of the EEC Trea-
ty or Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty) or
raise particularly delicate or difficult political
pI:oblems.
35. In view of the foregoing, there are few
cases where the formal voting rules can be
reviewed. The logic of our argument applies
first and foremost to the vast field of approx-
imation of laws under Article 100 of the
EEC Treaty, where majority voting will have
to be the rule if progress is not to become in-
extricably bogged down: take in partic\Jlar
customs legislation and the elimination' of
technical barriers to trade. But unanimity
should still be required where the proposed
Community rules relate to a subject which
in at least one Member State, is regulated by
(parliamentary) legislation or involves a point
of public policy, public security or public
health. There are different grounds for these
criteria, which demarcate the residual scope
of the unanimity rule. One concerns the type
of provision which would be affected by har-
monization in line with the logic inherent in
the second paragraph of Article 100 and Ar-
ticle 57(2) of the EEC Treaty.! The other con-
cerns the interests which the authors of the
EEC Treaty manifestly wished to give special
protection (Articles 36, 48, 53, and 56).
36. Applying the first criterion, the har-
monization of tax legislation will continue to
be a matter for a unanimous decision. Article
99 of the EEC Treaty should therefore not
be amended, at least at the current stage of
Community development. The same conclu-
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sion applies where tax harmonization would
come under Article 100 (direct taxation).
37. It would also be of practical use to
amend Article 28 of the EEC Treaty (auto-
nomous alteration or suspension of customs
second paragraph of Article 136 of the EEC Treaty
(association of the overseas countries and territories)
second paragraph of Article 238 of the EEC Treaty
and second paragraph of Article 206 of the Euratom
Treaty (association with non-member countries and
international organizations).
Likewise, the unanimity rule must be maintained for
any decision concerning the structure or composition of
the institutions:
Article 10(1) of the Merger Treaty (number of Mem-
bers of the Commission);
second paragraph of Article 12 of the Merger Treaty
(replacement of Members of the Commission);
fourth paragraph of Article 165 of the EEC Treaty and
fourth paragraph of Article 138 of the Euratom Treaty
(increase in the number of Judges);
third paragraph of Article 166 of the EEC Treaty and
third paragraph of Article 138 of the Euratom Treaty
(increase in the number of Advocates-General);
second paragraph of Article 194 of the EEC Treaty
and second paragraph of Article 166 of the Euratom
Treaty (appointment of Members of the Economic and
Social Committee).
For obvious reasons the rules governing use of lan-
guages fall into this category:
Article 217 of the EEC Treaty and Article 120 of the
Euratom Treaty.
Nor should there be any departure from the unanimity
rule where public policy, public security or public health
is to be protected:
Article 56(2) of the EEC Treaty (public policy deroga-
tion from the right of establishment for foreign na-
tionals-laws, regulations or administrative provi"
sions);
Articles 24(2) and 25(3) of the Euratom Treaty (secret
information);
or where the individual rights and interests of nationals
of the Member States are to be protected:
Article 75(3) of the EEC Treaty (serious effect of the
common transport policy on the standard of living
and on employment in certain areas);
Article 76 of the EEC Treaty (effect on carriers in
other Member States);
Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty (aids reg~~rded as com"
patible with the Treaty by way of exception from the
general rule).
Article 100 provides for further consultation of Par-
liament and the Economic and Social Committee on di-
rectives whose implementation would involve the
amendment of legislation in one or more Member
States; Articles 56(2) and 57(2) require unanimity on
matters which are the subject of legislation but allow
majority voting on subjects which are a matter for re-
gulation or administrative action in each Member State.duties). It is hardly logical to continue de-
manding unanimity here whereas similar
decisions can be taken by qualified majority
under Article 43 (agriculture) or Article 113
(commercial policy). There might also be
some easing of the terms of the Article to al-
low more use of the possibilities afforded by
the fourth indent of Article 155 of the EEC
Treaty with respect to routine changes or
suspensions.
38. If the Treaties are to be adjusted so that
the enlarged Community can move more eas-
ily towards maturity, the possibility of qual-
ified majority voting should be introduced at
Article 103(2) of the EEC Treaty on mea-
sures of 'conjunctural policy . If, as seems
increasingly likely, progress is made towards
economic and monetary union, the rules
now used to implement other common pol-
icies (Articles 43, 75, 113 etc. of the EEC
Treaty) would provide a useful guideline.
The prospect of enlargement makes it all the
more important to give greater bite to short-
term economic policy.
39. On similar lines thought might be giv-
, as progress is made towards monetary
union, to the possibility of majority voting
for directives concerning exchange policies
under Article 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (cap-
ital movements between Member States and
non-member countries).
40. Considerations of efficiency alsoindi-
cate that the financial and accounting provi-
sions referred to in Article 209 of the EEC
Treaty and Article 183 of the Euratom Trea-
ty (notably financial regulations) should be
adopted by qualified majority, like the bud-
get, whose establishment and implementa-
tion they serve. The enlarged Community
with growing financial responsibilities should
be in a position to adapt its management
rules to new situations and new constraints
without endlessly being faced with deadlock
and paralysis. This will of course in no way
affect the Council's undertaking to involve
Parli~'!lent in the process of adopting these
provIsIons.
41. Apart from the cases listed above,
where the changeover from unanimity to
majority voting would, at least potentially, be
of substantial practical value, there are other
Articles whose amendment, although of less-
er importance, would help to streamline the
enlarged Community decision-making
procedures.
42. The introduction of majority voting in
Article 51 of the EEC Treaty would make for
greater simplicity and consistency in the
rules governing the free movement of mi-
grant workers, the principle of which is laid
down in Article 48 and is to be put into ef-
fect progressively by the Couflcil, acting by
simple majority under Article 49. The specif-
ic aim of Article 51 is to facilitate freedom of
movement for workers by means of social
security arrangements.
43. Following the reasoning already set out
in relation to Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, 
the unanimity rule should apply in relation
to right of establishment under Article 57(2)
only on decisions that involve the amend-
ment of national legislation or affect public
policy, public security or public health.
44. Majority voting could also be envisaged
for decisions as to new tasks for the Social
Fund (Article 126(b) of the EEC Treaty),
though such tasks must remain within the
objectives set out ,in Article 123.
45. On the same criteria, adjustments to be
recommended for the Euratom Treaty would
concern only the first paragraph of Article 7
(multiannual programmes), Articles 47 and
48 Goint undertakings) and the first para-
graph of Article 69 (prices fixed under the
supplies provisions). The substance of these
Articles corresponds to that of the EEC Ar-
ticles relating to the management of com-
mon policies, where majority voting is gen-
erally provided for (Articles 43, 75 and 113).
There should therefore be no basic objection
to dropping the formal requirement of una-
nimity here.
Point 35.
S. 2/7846. Experience has shown that only the re-
form of the first paragraph of Article 7 of the
Euratom Treaty is of major practical interest;
this provision concerns one of the most im-
portant decisions required for the implemen-
tation ofa common nuclear research policy,
namely the adoption from time to time of
multiannual programmes. In the past the
procedure here has been particularly slow
and cumbersome because of the need for
unanimity, and Euratom has suffered as a
result. At the beginning of the atomic age
when Community action was only just get-
ting under way, it was understandable that
the Member States should insist on a una-
nimous decision.. But a more flexible attitude
is now possible, and indeed necessary, if an
enlarged Atomic Energy Community is to
work. Since the general orientation of Eur-
atom research policy is no longer disputed, it
would seem reasonable to agree to majority
decisions being taken on programmes to give
practical expression to this policy, as is the
case with the common policies worked out
under the EEC Treaty. In addition there is a
budgetary argument: because of the recent
changes in the budgetary procedure and of
the power that Parliament has acquired in
this field, decisions taken under the first
paragraph of Article 7 of the Euratom Treaty
have now lost part of their earlier import-
ance.
47. The question of adjustments to the
ECSC Treaty has to be seen in different
terms, since the general system of this Trea-
ty is different from that of the EEC or Eu-
ratom Treaty. The ECSC Treaty is a 'traite-
loi' , which is to say that the rules governing
ECSC activities are laid down in the Treaty
itself. When the institutions act under the
Treaty, they simply apply those rules and
have very little in the way of a subordinate
law-making function. Leaving aside Article
78f of the ECSC Treaty (adoption of finan-
cing and accounting provisions), which
would have to be amended along with Arti-
cles 209 of the EEC Treaty and 183 of the
Euratom Treaty, 1 it is only in those rare
cases where the Commission must obtain
the Council's assent (which requires unanim-
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ity) that there is any need to consider con-
verting the requirement of unanimity into
the possibility of a qualified majority. But
Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty does not allow
for such far-reaching action as Article 237 of
the EEC Treaty or Article 205 of the Eura-
tom Treaty, since it is for the Council alone
to determine the conditions of accession and
national Parliaments have no role to play.
This is not to say that the conditions of ac-
cession cannot entail minor adjustments in-
spired by a reasoning similar to that behind
the adjustments to the EEC and Euratom
Treaties, going beyond purely 'numerical'
changes, It might be possible, for instance, to
enter in the ECSC Treaty the rule (already in
the EEC and Euratom Treaties) that an ab-
stention shall not prevent the adoption of
acts which require unanimity (see the third
paragraph of Article 28 of the ECSC Treaty).
Adjustment in matters of substance
48. The EEC Treaty (Article 84(2)) makes
rather special, not to say unique, provisions
for sea and air transport. But in view of de-
velopments in Community law there have
been moves towards common action in these
sectors. Both areas took on added signifi~
cance when the Community increased from
Six to Nine, and the process will be repeated
when the Community expands to Twelve.
The advent of Greece will swell the tonnage
of the fleet sailing under Community flags
by one third, and there will be considerable
expansion in the air transport sector when
the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese air traf-
fic, airports and airlines are counted in. It
therefore seems advisable to adjust the Trea-
ty to enable the common transport policy to
develop in respect of shipping and air trans~
port, allowing for the rather speCial nature of
these two sectors. Any adjustment should
also include the possibility of voting by
qualified majority, as is the case under the
other common policies.
Point 40.Exercise of administrative
and executive powers
49. The point has been made on numerous
occasions that subsidiary Council bodies are
so overburdened with secondary matters that
they are unable to concentrate on really im-
portant issues and prepare the ground thor-
oughly for discussions by the Council itself.
Despite the practical value of conferring ad-
ministrative and executive powers on the.
Commission for the implementation of Com-
munity Regulations, the Council still does
not make adequate use of the possibility
offered by the fourth indent of Article 155 of
the EEC Treaty (fourth indent of Article 124
of the Euratom Treaty). In certain cases the
Council, by reserving for itself the power to
take individual executive measures, notably
where there are budgetary implications, is in
strictly legal terms encroaching on the fields
reserved for the Commission by the Treaties.
The Commission recently forwarded a paper
to the European Council listing fields where
it should systematically be given full admin-
istrative and executive powers.
50. When the Community has a greater
number of members it will be even more ne-
cessary to relieve the Council and its subsid-
iary bodies of preparatory work on technical
implementation matters and to use decision~
making procedures which guarantee flexibil-
ity and speed~which have been achieved, as
abundant experience shows, whenever a de-
cision has been left to the Commission with
the assistance, more and more often, of man-
agement and legislative committees. The
simplest approach would be to alter the
fourth indent of Article 155 of the EEC
Treaty (and the fourth indent of Article 124
of the Euratom Treaty) to provide that the
Commission shall exercise administrative
and executive powers unless the Council de-
cides otherwise. This would introduce into
the Community legal order a method of ac-
tion whose value has been recognized in the
many official statements in the past (the
most important being the communique put
out by the Heads of State or Government at
the 1974 SummitV The Council would still
have the power to reserve a decision for itself
whenever it considered the matter under
consideration to be politically sensitive. For
implementing measures it could also make
provision for committees of Member States
representatives according to the usual proce-
dures, and the possibility of difficult deci-
sions being referred back to the Council it-
self. The tried and tested arrangements now
being used would continue to apply.
Choice of legal instruments
51. Most of the articles of the EEC and Eur-
atom Treaties either state that they are to be
implemented by any of the legal instruments
(notably regulations directives or decisions)
specified in Articles 189 of the EEC Treaty
and 161 of the Euratom Treaty, or are silent
on this point~which boils down to the same
thing. Some articles, in contrast, prescribe the
exclusive use of a given instrument. A case
in point is Article 100 of the EEC Treaty,
which prescribes the use of directives for the
harmonization of such national provisions as
directly affect the establishment or function-
ing of the common market.3 But these direc-
tives are sometimes so detailed that national
authorities (and national parliaments in those
cases where it is up to them to take the ne-
cessary implementing measures) have virtu-
ally no freedom of action. The result is either
lack of interest or blatant hostility, frequently
leading to delays, which can be considerable,
in the transposition of directives, not to
mention the difficulty of checking national
provisions for conformity with the directives.
For this reason provisions such as Article
100 could be amended to advantage to give
the Community legislator the right to choose
the legal instrument (regulation or directive)
to be used in each case.
Bull. EC 11-1977, point 2.3.23.
Point 8 of the communique; Bull. EC 12-1974, point
1104.
3 See also the following Articles of the EEC Treaty: 56
and 57 (coordination in the matter of right of establish-
ment), 70 (coordination of exchange policies) and 99 (tax
harmonization).
S. 2/7852. The basic feature of the Community
legal system is the principle that there should
be a single body of secondary legislation.
This principle is clearly set out in the second
paragraph of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty,
which states that a regulation shall be bind-
ing in its entirety and directly applicable in
all Member States.
This principle of universality does not imply
the uniformity of Community law. On the
contrary, the Court of Justice has ruled that
the principle of non-discrimination is a gen-
eral principle of law binding on all Commu~
nity bodies. So different cases must be
handled in different ways. And the only way
of distinguishing between fundamental and
incidental differences is to refer to the prin-
ciples and objectives on which the Treaty is
founded. This means, for instance, that the
unity of the common market should not be
put at risk, that~in the context of the har-
monization of legislation~xisting differ-
ences between Member States should not be
aggravated, and that any deferred or differen-
tiated application of Community law should
cease as soon as circumstances allow.
Given the greater heterogeneity of an en-
larged Community, it might be advisable to
write into the Treaty itself some definition of
the criteria and limitations governing the
type of differentiated application that would
be compatible with the principles and aims of
the Community.
Parliament
53. In this paper we have proposed a num-
ber of adjustments to the Treaties which, fol-
lowing enlargement, should help to improve
the  modus operandi  of the Community s in-
stitutions, with particular reference to deci-
sion-making. These proposals would be in-
complete if there were no reference to the
potential implications for Parliament
In purely formal terms, it must be stated
that adjustments under Articles 237 of the
EEC Treaty and 205 of the Euratom Treaty,
to which this paper is devoted, cannot alter
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provisions of the Treaties which affect Parli-
ament's role. Any change in the balance of
power between institutions would have to be
effected under Articles 236 of the EEC Trea-
ty and 204 of the Euratom Treaty. But in
practice it would be possible, without amend-
ing the Treaties themselves, to extend the
conciliation procedure' that already exists
between Parliament, the Council and the
Commission beyond its current field of appli-
cation, namely general Community instru-
ments having substantial financial implica-
tions.1 There is no reason why the institu-
tions should not agree between themselves
to apply this procedure to legislation on other
matters.
I The conciliation procedure instituted in March 1975
by a joint declaration of Parliament, the Council and the
Commission involves a conciliation committee which al-
lows direct negotiation to take place between the Coun-
cil and representatives of Parliament. The Commission
sits in.European Communities  Commission
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If the Community is to develop in order to be able to integrate the new Member States
and to satisfy their hopes, there must be no slackening of efforts to complete the com-
mon market .and to achieve economic and monetary union. 'The transitional period and
the institutional implications of enlargement' supplements the Commission s Communica-
tion to the Council setting out its general considerations on the problems of enlargement.
In spotlights the need to develop a real transitional strategy which will see the harmonious
integration of the new members and to plan adjustments to the Treaties which are not
simply numerical changes but will help the enlarged Community to run smoothly.